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OF FOXES AND HEN HOUSES: LICENSING AND THE HEALTH PRO-
FESSIONS. By Stanley J. Gross. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press. 
1984. Pp. xi, 185. $35. 
The health professions have come under increasing scrutiny in re-
cent years. Rapidly increasing health care costs and inadequacies in 
the organization and delivery of health care services have provoked a 
flood of literature dealing with the regulation of the health professions. 
Professor Gross's1 Of Foxes and Hen Houses is an interdisciplinary 
synthesis of this literature; he draws from the work of economists, 
sociologists, psychologists, historians, political scientists, and lawyers 
in analyzing the phenomenon of regulation by licensing. 
Gross defines licensing as a "generic term referring to all forms of 
control over the right to perform specific activities" (p. 8).2 Licensing 
is only one part of a general system of regulation which includes "mal-
practice suits by clients, credentialing of individuals by professional 
organizations, institutional accreditation, the Federal Trade Commis-
sion, and state and federal court decisions" (p. 7). It is a means of 
"input regulation," that is, an attempt to regulate by controlling who 
may carry on an activity, as distinguished from "process regulation," 
which is an attempt to control the activity itself, and "output regula-
tion," which emphasizes an assessment of the consequences of the ac-
tivity. Gross focuses his discussion on licensing under the prevailing 
"practice acts," which result in a state-created monopoly by prevent-
ing unlicensed persons from engaging in certain defined tasks (p. 9). 
Although the book's title suggests an emphasis on the conflicts of 
interest inherent in self-regulated professions, the book itself is primar-
ily concerned with the use of credentials as a source of information 
about the qualifications of the provider of services. In the preface, the 
author notes that the bulk of research and scholarship is critical of 
licensing and that his position is that it is not the current licensing 
systems which are faulty but that licensing itself is inherently defective 
as a means of regulation (p. xii). The former point is demonstrated by 
the author's pervasive use of quotations and summaries of other au-
thorities. In each chapter Gross marshalls dozens of citations in rapid 
succession to support his attack on licensing systems. Regrettably the 
latter point is demonstrated only by the author's consistent reliance on 
ambiguous data. 
The battle lines are drawn in the second chapter. The usual ration-
ale for licensing is "to protect the public from harm and fraud at the 
hands of incompetent and unethical practitioners" (p. 16). The argu-
ment is that consumers lack the information to choose competent, eth-
1. Stanley J. Gross is Professor of Counseling Psychology at Indiana State University. 
2. While Gross concentrates on the medical profession, his analysis is intended to apply to all 
professions and occupations. 
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ical practitioners, that individuals are not sophisticated enough to 
evaluate accurately which choices are in their best interests, and that 
the choice of inappropriate practitioners results in external costs. A 
secondary rationale is to protect practitioners, who after years of edu-
cation and experience are entitled to the dignity, prestige, and compet-
itive advantage of licensing. This rationale appears to be rather far-
fetched, but Gross offers as support the testimony of several individu-
als who sought to justify licensing on such a theory in hearings before 
the California Senate Committee on Business and Professions (p. 20). 
Gross then outlines the case against licensing, introducing six ar-
guments that are explored in greater depth throughout the book. 
First, licensing agencies tend to create an artificial scarcity of trained 
practitioners (p. 22). Second, they may raise prices and restrain com-
petition by creating monopolistic conditions (p. 24). Third, licensing 
may incorporate the ethics, standards and interests of private associa-
tions into administrative regulations, thus delegating regulatory pow-
ers to the regulated groups (p. 28). Fourth, licensing tends to inhibit 
innovation (p. 29). Fifth, licensing agencies may take arbitrary and 
unreasonable action as the result of bureaucratic rules (pp. 31-32). Fi-
nally, there is a "relative absence of accountability to the public for the 
mission for which occupational licensing was chartered" (pp. 34-35). 
The middle chapters of the book are concerned with licensing as a 
social phenomenon. Of particular interest is the discussion of the na-
ture of the professions and the concomitant development of licensing 
(p. 68). Professions primarily represent new ways of organizing 
knowledge and relationships. Professions also have two secondary 
functions. The first is economic, resulting from the emergence of new 
opportunities for earning a living. The second is social; with the de-
cline in the aristocratic tradition, professions became institutions to 
preserve the privileges of the elite. Gross describes the "attributes" 
associated with society's concept of an ideal profession as a sense of 
calling, a body of knowledge, a formal organization, a high degree of 
autonomy, and an altruistic attitude (p. 72). These attributes, in tum, 
solidify the status of the profession within society. 
In order to further analyze the commercial reality of the modem 
professions Gross compares them to medieval guilds. Licensing allows 
professionals to treat their expertise as a commodity over which they 
have exclusive control. This phenomenon occurs while society relies 
on professions to police themselves in the public interest. Thus, the 
guild analogy is appropriate. 
Next, Gross describes the various forms that licensing agencies can 
take, the functions that they perform, and the problems that they face. 
After this the book begins to falter. Having described the licensing 
controversy, put it in its social and historical context, and having pro-
vided the reader with a practical perspective on the subject, the author 
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fails to provide a convincing resolution. The reader is told that "[t]he 
problem of regulation is the difference between what is espoused as its 
purpose and what it actually accomplishes" (p. 105). Since Gross has 
conceded that "[t]he legitimate purposes of licensing are compelling" 
(p. 21), a detailed discussion of what licensing actually accomplishes is 
crucial. Instead the reader is left to speculate. The author states that 
the unavailability of certain data necessary for resolving the licensing 
controversy "argues against the position that licensing protects the 
public" (p. 115). 
The persistent failure to provide convincing solutions is further re-
flected in the treatment of the problem of competency. Gross con-
cludes that traditionally defined qualifications to ensure competency 
have not been found (p. 134). Because of this, new approaches are 
required, but the author's suggested "goal of developing performance-
based examinations that rely on criteria validated on client outcomes 
appears to be beyond the state of the art at this time" (p. 134). The 
author believes that it is possible to develop such criteria, but "[i]f. . . 
it is decided that it is impossible to validly estimate practitioner com-
petence this would tum into another argument against the advisability 
of attempting to protect consumers and for information based strate-
gies that enhance consumer self-protection" (p. 134). This is a difficult 
argument to comprehend in the first place. It is all the more difficult 
to accept because of the author's continued use of the lack of informa-
tion necessary to resolve a question as the basis for his conclusion. 
Finally, Gross surveys twenty-five recent studies examining the re-
lationship between licensing and quality of service. He acknowledges 
that they "do not provide profoundly credible results" (p. 138). He 
also notes that they were "relatively crude" studies of the association 
between licensing and quality, so that causation cannot be presumed 
(p. 144). Again the reader is left to speculate whether licensing pro-
tects the public. Gross forcefully details the shortcomings of licensing 
agencies in assessing initial competence, monitoring continuing com-
petence, disciplining errant practitioners, and in promoting the distri-
bution of professionals and the utilization of paraprofessionals. These 
are formidable problems and they are relevant to the discussion, but in 
the end the reader, along with the author, is merely "tempted to spec-
ulate that [licensing] participates with other factors to ensure . . . 
much less than competent service to a large number of Americans" (p. 
159). 
Gross concludes that people should rely less on the government 
and more on themselves for protection against incompetent and uneth-
ical practitioners. In order to accomplish this, consumers need "suffi-
cient information, effective alternatives, accountability, reduced cost, 
and protections against those who would exploit their lack of knowl-
edge" (p. 161). Gross grounds his "structure for change" on the de-
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velopment of a competitive market for medical services. In 
furtherance of this goal, he proposes increasing consumers' freedom of 
choice of practitioners by eliminating restrictions on who may provide 
the service, regulating dangerous procedures, regulating professional 
disclosure to provide for increased information while maintaining ac-
curacy, using nongovernmental resources such as voluntary certifica-
tion and performance evaluations by professional associations or 
consumer groups, and providing adequate information for evaluating 
the success of a regulatory program (pp. 160-85). 
These proposals are considerably less radical than the reader might 
have expected. They could be adopted to complement licensing sys-
tems rather than to replace them. Moreover, as Gross describes the 
implementation of his proposals, it is clear that a high degree of regu-
lation, albeit in a form other than licensing, is still necessary. For ex-
ample, advertising is advocated as a means of professional disclosure, 
yet the need to police deceptive advertising is also acknowledged (pp. 
168-70). The need to continue regulating "dangerous procedures" also 
requires government regulation, and as Gross describes it, this propo-
sal is vulnerable to all the criticisms levied against licensing in general, 
although in a somewhat narrower field (p. 168). The solutions offered 
help to reduce the conflict of interest problems inherent in self-regula-
tion by experts, but they do not address the more fundamental prob-
lem of gathering accurate information about the competence of 
individual practitioners. 
In sum, Of Foxes and Henhouses is a superficial book. It is note-
worthy for its scope, but this feature has been achieved by engaging in 
a persistently shallow analysis. The book serves as an adequate survey 
of the existing literature and it contains a useful bibliography, but it 
offers little in the way of original scholarship. The author missed an 
opportunity to make valuable contributions where the literature was 
inconclusive by leaving the reader with little more than biased 
speculations. 
